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a b s t r a c t
Gödel initiated the program of finding and justifying axioms that effect a significant
reduction in incompleteness and he drew a fundamental distinction between intrinsic and
extrinsic justifications. Reflection principles are the most promising candidates for new
axioms that are intrinsically justified. Taking as our starting point Tait’s work on general
reflection principles, we prove a series of limitative results concerning this approach.
These results collectively show that general reflection principles are either weak (in that
they are consistent relative to the Erdös cardinal κ(ω)) or inconsistent. The philosophical
significance of these results is discussed.
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The incompleteness phenomenon in set theory provides uswith natural statements ofmathematics that cannot be settled
on the basis of the standard axioms of set theory, ZFC. Two classic examples of such statements are PU (the statement
that all projective sets admit of a projective uniformization) and CH (Cantor’s continuum hypothesis). This leads to the
programof seeking and justifying newaxiomswhich settle the undecided statements. This programhas both amathematical
component and a philosophical component. On the mathematical side, one must find axioms that are sufficiently strong to
do the work. On the philosophical side, one must determine, first, what would count as a justification and, second, whether
the axioms in question are justified. In this paper I will investigate these two aspects of one promising approach to justifying
new axioms—the approach based on reflection principles.1
1. Introduction
The question motivating this work is: Can intrinsic justifications secure reflection principles that are sufficiently strong
to effect a significant reduction in incompleteness? To render this question more precise I will discuss the notions of an
‘‘intrinsic justification’’ and a ‘‘significant reduction in incompleteness’’ (in the present section) and the notion of a ‘‘reflection
principle’’ (in the next section).
Intrinsic versus Extrinsic Justifications. In his classic paper on the continuum problem [2,3] Gödel drew a fundamental
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic justifications. The discussion pertains to the iterative concept of set, that is, the
concept of set ‘‘according to which a set is something obtainable from the integers (or some other well-defined objects)
by iterated application of the operation ‘‘set of’’ ’’ ([3], p. 259). Gödel maintains that the ‘‘axioms of set theory [ZFC] by no
means form a system closed in itself, but, quite on the contrary, the very concept of set on which they are based suggests
their extension by new axioms which assert the existence of still further iterations of the operation ‘‘set of’’ ’’ (260). He
mentions as examples the axioms asserting the existence of inaccessible and Mahlo cardinals and maintains that ‘‘[t]hese
axioms show clearly, not only that the axiomatic system of set theory as used today is incomplete, but also that it can be
I I would like to thank Bill Tait for sparking my interest in the topic and for fruitful correspondence.∗ Tel.: +1 (617) 495 3970.
E-mail address: koellner@fas.harvard.edu.
1 The result in Section 4 was proved in my dissertation [5]. The remaining results were proved in the Spring and Summer of 2007.
0168-0072/$ – see front matter© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.apal.2008.09.007
P. Koellner / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 157 (2009) 206–219 207
supplemented without arbitrariness by new axioms which only unfold the content of the concept of set as explained above’’
(260–261, my emphasis). Since Gödel later refers to such axioms as having ‘‘intrinsic necessary’’ I shall accordingly speak of
such axioms being intrinsically justified on the basis of the iterative concept of set.2
The notion of an intrinsic justification on the basis of the iterative conception of set begs for sharpening. It appears that
Gödel took it to be a fundamental form of justification, one that cannot be explained in more primitive terms. Nevertheless,
one can explicate the idea of that Gödel appears to have in mind by comparing and contrasting it with other notions and
by pointing to examples. One such point of contrast is that of an extrinsic justification, which Gödel introduces as follows:
‘‘[E]ven disregarding the intrinsic necessity of some new axiom, and even in case it has no intrinsic necessity at all, a probable
decision about its truth is possible also in anotherway, namely, inductively by studying its ‘‘success’’ (261). Here by ‘‘success’’
Gödel means ‘‘fruitfulness in consequences, in particular ‘‘verifiable’’ consequences’’. In a famous passage he says: ‘‘There
might exist axioms so abundant in their verifiable consequences, shedding so much light upon a whole field, and yielding
such powerfulmethods for solving problems (and even solving them constructively, as far as that is possible) that, nomatter
whether or not they are intrinsically necessary, they would have to be accepted at least in the same sense as any well-
established physical theory’’ (261).
Let us now consider some examples. Consider first the conception of natural number that underlies the system of Peano
Arithmetic (PA). This conception of natural number not only justifies mathematical induction for the language of PA but for
any extension of the language of PA that is meaningful. For example, if we extend the language of PA by adding the Tarski
truth predicate and we extend the axioms of PA by adding the Tarski truth axioms, then, on the basis of the conception
of natural number, we are justified in accepting instances of mathematical induction involving the truth predicate. In
the resulting system one can prove Con(PA). This process can then be iterated. Moreover, there are other examples of
axioms that are intrinsically justified on the basis of the conception of natural number; for example, the proof-theoretic
reflection principles.3 In contrast, theΠ01 statement Con(ZF+ AD) is undoubtedly not intrinsically justified on the basis of
the conception of natural number; rather its justification flows from an intricate network of theorems in contemporary set
theory.4
Consider next the iterative conception of set. As in the case of arithmetic this conception (arguably) intrinsically justifies
instances of Replacement and Comprehension for certain extensions of the language of set theory. But there are richer
principles that are (arguably) intrinsically justified on the basis of this conception, namely, the set-theoretic reflection
principles. These principles assert (roughly) that any property that holds of V holds of some initial segment Vα . These
principles yield inaccessible and Mahlo cardinals (and more) and quite likely underly Gödel’s claims in the above passage. I
shall return to them in the next section.
One can also gain a sharper understanding of the notion of intrinsic justification by pointing to some of its properties.
First, an intrinsically justified statement need not be self-evident, in part because the justification may be quite involved
(for example, in the case of arithmetic, this would be the case with reflection principles at the level of some large ordinal
approaching Γ0), in part because it is possible that the underlying conception is problematic (as, for example, was the case
with the Fregean conception of extension). On the other hand, the notion of intrinsic justification is intended to be more
secure than mere ‘‘intrinsic plausibility’’ (in the sense of [11]), in that whereas the latter merely adds credence, the former
is intended to be definitive (modulo the tenability of the conception).
The question of how far intrinsic justifications can take us in securing new axioms is important for a number of reasons.
First, intrinsic justifications would seem to be more secure than extrinsic justifications. Second, intrinsic justifications are
more in line with traditional conceptions of mathematics. Indeed a number of people reject extrinsic justifications. This
appears to be true of Gödel during his early development (as suggested in Section 1 of [6]). And it is certainly true of a
number of more recent thinkers. For example, in a discussion of extrinsic justifications, Tait writes:
It is difficult to reconcile this with the iterative conception of the universe of sets we are discussing here. On the latter
conception, the ‘‘intrinsic necessity’’ of an axiom arises from the fact that it expresses that some property possessed
by the totality of ordinals is possessed by some ordinal. To introduce a new axiom as ‘‘true’’ on this conception because
of its ‘‘success’’ would have no more justification than introducing in the study of Euclidean space points and lines at
infinity because of their success. . . . A ‘‘probable decision’’ about the truth of a proposition from the point of view of
the iterative conception can only be a probable decision about its derivability from that conception. Otherwise, how
can we know that a probable decision on the basis of success might not lead us to negate what we otherwise take to
be an intrinsically necessary truth? ([17], reprinted in [19], p. 284).5
In addition to being interesting because of its rejection of extrinsic justifications this passage is of interest since in it Tait
takes intrinsic justifications (on the basis of the iterative conception of set) to be exhausted by reflection principles.
2 I shall also employ themore neutral notion of the iterative conception of set rather that the iterative concept of set since there is nothing in this discussion
that rests on a robust form of conceptual realism such as that of Gödel. For discussions of Gödel’s conceptual realism see [10,8].
3 For more on this subject see [1] and the references therein.
4 See Section 3 of [6] for more on this.
5 I am not convinced of this claim, in part because the analogous claim concerning the conception of natural number seems to be false. For example, the
justification of the statement Con(ZF+AD) is not ‘‘derivable from’’ the conception of natural number and yet I do not think that we should be worried that
it might ‘‘lead us to negate what we otherwise take to be an intrinsically necessary truth’’ with respect to the conception of natural number.
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Now, I would not wish to defend this idea. But I do think that reflection principles are the best current candidates for
axioms that admit such an intrinsic justification. In any case, reflection principles shall be my focus here (though in the final
section of the paper I shall consider some alternatives). Our question then is whether intrinsic justifications (on the basis of
the iterative conception of set) can secure reflection principles that effect a significant reduction in incompleteness.
Significant Reduction in Incompleteness. I will be using the large cardinal hierarchy as a yardstick tomeasure the strength of
reflection principles. As one climbs this hierarchy there is an increasing reduction in incompleteness. To render our question
precise it is useful to fix on a specific target. A natural candidate is the axiom ‘‘for all sets X , X# exists’’. One reason is that
at this stage the basic results of descriptive set theory which can be established in ZFC lift to the next level. For example,
this axiom impliesΠ∼
1
1-determinacy. A more theoretical reason is connected with absoluteness. Shoenfield showed (in ZFC)
that the Σ∼
1
2-theory is ‘‘frozen’’ in that it cannot be altered by set forcing. This provides one with a method of converting
consistency (established via forcing) into truth since if one shows aΣ∼
1
2-statement to be consistent by forcing then it must,
by Shoenfield absoluteness, be true in V . Now one should like to be in this situation for the next pointclass,Σ∼
1
3. The axiom
‘‘for all sets X , X# exists’’ is precisely the level at which this happens, in the following sense: By results of Woodin, Martin
and Solovay, for axioms Awhich are invariant under set forcing, the theory ZFC+ Awill be generically absolute forΣ∼ 13 iff it
proves that for every X , X# exists.6 Since, without loss of generality, we will be able to assume that our axioms (reflection
principles) have this feature of generic invariance, this is a reasonable target in terms of a reduction in incompleteness.
Our question then is whether reflection principles can effect a significant reduction in this sense. The first step would be
to show that reflection principles imply 0#. Now it is often maintained that large cardinals in general are justified in terms
of reflection principles. Gödel appears to have held such a view:
Generally I believe that, in the last analysis, every axiom of infinity should be derivable from the (extremely plausible)
principle that V is indefinable, where definability is to be taken in [a] more and more generalized and idealized sense
([20], p. 325, [21], p. 285).
Since the most natural way to assert that V is undefinable is via reflection principles and since to assert this in a ‘‘more
and more generalized and idealized sense’’ is to move to languages of higher-order with higher-order parameters, Gödel is
(arguably) espousing the view that higher-order reflection principles imply all large cardinal axioms. Others appear to say
this directly.7
It is of interest then to determine whether such a view can be sharpened and upheld. We shall do this by taking Tait’s
work on general reflection principles [14–16,18] as our starting point. [18] says that his bottom-up approach may have
the resources to lead beyond the V= L barrier (p. 135). As we shall see, it follows from the limitative results below that
current reflection principles do not imply 0# and hence cannot lead to a significant reduction in incompleteness (in the
sense indicated above).
2. Reflection principles
Reflection principles aim to articulate the informal idea that the height of the universe is ‘‘absolutely infinite’’ and hence
cannot be ‘‘characterized from below’’. These principles assert that any statement true in V is true in some smaller Vα . Thus,
for any ϕ one cannot define V as the collection which satisfies ϕ since there will be a proper initial segment Vα of V that
satisfies ϕ. More formally, we shall write this as
V |= ϕ(A) → ∃α Vα |= ϕα(Aα)
where ϕα( · ) is the result of relativizing the quantifiers of ϕ( · ) to Vα and Aα is the result of relativizing the A to Vα . This
schematic characterization of a reflection principle will be filled in as we proceed by (1) specifying the language and (2)
specifying the nature of relativization.
For the time being our language will be the language of set theory extended with variables of all finite orders. We shall
use x, y, z, . . . as variables of the first order and, for m > 2, X (m), Y (m), Z (m), . . . as variables of the mth order.8 Relative to
Vα the first-order variables are interpreted to range over the elements of Vα and, for m > 1, the mth-order variables are
interpreted to range over the elements of an isomorphic version of Vα+(m−1). The reason for using an isomorphic copy of
Vα+(m−1) and not Vα+(m−1) itself is that we wish to keep track of the set/class distinction in cases where a set and class have
the same extension. For definiteness, in the case of m = 2 we shall use α × Vα+1 and we shall interpret class membership
‘‘y ∈ (α, x)’’ as y ∈ x. The cases wherem > 2 are handled similarly.
We now turn to the nature of relativization. If A(2) is a second-order parameter over Vα , then the relativization of A(2)
to Vβ , written A(2),β , is A ∩ Vβ .9 This is how A(2) looks from ‘‘the point of view of Vβ ’’. The relativization of higher-order
6 See [22].
7 For example, in [9], the authors write: ‘‘We know of one proper extension of ZFC which is as well justified as ZFC itself, namely ZFC + ‘ZFC is consistent’.
Extrapolating wildly, we are led to strong reflection principles, also known as large cardinal axioms (one can fill in some intermediate steps). These principles
assert that certain properties of the universe V of all sets are shared by, or ‘‘reflect to’’, initial segments Vα of the cumulative hierarchy of sets’’ (72). However,
although the authors appear to speak of reflection principles in our sense, they may have in mind the principles of Reinhardt, which, as will be discussed
in the final section, have a different form.
8 When the order of a variable or parameter is clear from context we shall often drop the superscript for notational simplicity.
9 More precisely, given our coding apparatus, A(2),β is really {x ∈ Vβ | (α, x) ∈ A(2)}, but we shall suppress such fine points in the future.
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parameters is defined inductively in the natural way: Form > 1, A(m+1),β = {B(m),β | B(m) ∈ A(m+1)}. The relativization of a
higher-order formula ϕ to the level Vβ is obtained by interpreting the first-order variables to range over Vβ and, form > 1,
mth-order variables to range over the elements of Vβ+(m−1).
With these specifications we now have a hierarchy of reflection principles. For reasons which will become apparent in
the next section, we shall restrict ourselves for the time being to parameters of second order. Let us recall some basic facts:
Let T be the theory ZFC− Infinity−Replacement. If one supplements T with the scheme for second-order reflection then the
resulting theory implies Infinity and Replacement. Moreover, in the second-order language, one can express the statement
‘‘Ω is (strongly) inaccessible’’ (where ‘Ω ’ designates the class of ordinals) and so, assuming second-order reflection, there
exists κ such that κ is inaccessible (and thus Vκ |= ZFC). We can then reflect the statement ‘‘Ω is an inaccessible greater
than κ ’’ to get an inaccessible above κ and, continuing in this manner, we obtain a proper class of inaccessibles. Thus,Ω is
an inaccessible limit of inaccessibles and hence, by reflection, there exists κ which is an inaccessible limit of inaccessibles.
Continuing in this manner one obtains the various orders of inaccessibles and Mahlos. One then obtains weakly compact
cardinals and, moving up through the higher-order languages, one obtains the higher-order indescribable cardinals.
Before proceeding further let us examine some philosophical difficulties with the claim that higher-order reflection
principles are intrinsically justified on the basis of the iterative conception of set.
The most basic difficulty involves the interpretation of higher-order quantification and turns on how one conceives
of the ‘‘totality of sets’’. There are two conceptions of the ‘‘totality of sets’’—the actualist conception and the potentialist
conception. The actualist maintains that the totality of sets is a ‘‘completed totality’’, while the potentialist denies this. These
two viewpoints face complementary difficulties in providing an intrinsic justification of higher-order reflection principles.
On the actualist view one can refer to the totality of sets and thus one can articulate the idea that this totality cannot be
described from below and hence satisfies the reflection principles. However, since there are no sets beyond this totality it
is hard on this view to make sense of full higher-order quantification over the universe of sets.10 On the potentialist view
the closest one can come to speaking of the totality of sets is through speaking of some Vα . One can certainly make sense of
higher-order quantification over Vα but now the difficulty lies in motivating and justifying reflection principles.
I know of two attempts to get around this difficulty. The first is the theory of legitimate candidates of Reinhardt. The
second is the bottom up approach of Tait. I will say something about the former in the final section of this paper. Here I will
concentrate on the latter.
Tait’s approach takes its starting point in what he calls the Cantorian Principle, namely, the principle which asserts that
if and initial segment A ⊆ Ω is a set then it has a strict upper bound S(A) ∈ Ω . This is the principle which Cantor used to
introduce (in a highly impredicative fashion) the totality of ordinalsΩ . It follows (from thewell-foundedness of the ordinals)
thatΩ is not a set. The problemwith this principle is that it involves reference to the notion of ‘‘set’’ (in contrast to the notion
of ‘‘class’’ or ‘‘inconsistent multiplicity’’) and this notion (and distinction) is far from clear. For this reason Tait replaces the
principle with a hierarchy of Relativized Cantorian Principles. For a given condition C (called an existence condition) such a
principle asserts that if an initial segment A ⊆ ΩC satisfies C then it has a strict upper bound S(A) ∈ ΩC . It follows (from
the well-foundedness of the ordinals) thatΩC does not satisfy the condition C .
One can now obtain reflection principles by the appropriate choice of an existence condition. For example, suppose we
wish to construct an ordinalΩC such that for a given second-order formula ϕ(X), VΩC satisfies ϕ-reflection, that is,
∀X (2) ⊆ VΩC
(
VΩC |= ϕ(X (2))→ ∃α ϕα(X (2),α)
)
.
We simply take the condition C on initial segments A ⊆ ΩC to be
∃X (2) ⊆ VA
(
VA |= ϕ(X (2)) ∧ ∀α ∈ A¬ϕα(X (2),α)
)
.
Applying the Relativized Cantorian Principle to this condition and appealing again to the well-foundedness of the ordinals,
we have that ΩC does not satisfy C , that is, VΩC satisfies ϕ-reflection. The trouble is that this method is too general. For
example, suppose we wish to introduceΩC ′ such that VΩC ′ satisfies that there is a ϕ-cardinal, where ‘ϕ’ could be anything,
such as ‘supercompact’ or ‘Reinhardt’. Let C ′ be the following condition on A: VA 6|= ‘‘There is a ϕ-cardinal’’. Applying the
Relativized Cantorian Principle to this condition and appealing to the well-foundedness of the ordinals, we have that ΩC
does not satisfy C ′, that is, VΩC |= ‘‘There is a ϕ-cardinal’’.
In short, whether the Relativized Cantorian Principle is intrinsically justified on the basis of the iterative conception of set
will turn on the particular choice of the condition C that one considers. Onewould need to argue that in the case of conditions
C that give rise to reflection principles the resulting instances of the Relativized Cantorian Principle are intrinsically justified.
This is far from immediate. Furthermore, as we shall see, such a case cannot be made for a broad class of the instances that
Tait considers since the resulting principles are inconsistent. Moreover, it is hard to see how one could draw the line in a
principled fashion.
These philosophical difficulties show that at the moment we do not have a strong intrinsic justification of higher-order
reflection principles. Onewould like, however, to say somethingmore definitive. In the remainder of this paper I will prove a
number of limitative results which collectively show that higher-order reflection principles are either weak or inconsistent.
10 One can, of course, simulate the construction of L over the universe for any ordinal that one can make sense of ‘‘internally’’ with the help of
bootstrapping, but the resulting principles are quite weak. Now, there are some actualists who think that there is no problem in having full second-order
quantification over the universe of sets. I am thinking here of advocates of the plural interpretation of second-order quantification. It would take us too far
afield to consider this view in detail. In any case, the resulting principles fall under the limitative results to be presented below.
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3. Strong reflection principles
The next step is to allowparameters of third- and higher-order. Unfortunately, when one does this the resulting reflection
principles are inconsistent, as noted in [13]. To see this let
A(3) = {{ξ | ξ < α}(2) | α ∈ Ω}(3)
and let ϕ(A(3)) be the statement that each element of A(3) is bounded. This statement is true over V but for each α ∈ Ω the
reflected version of the statement, ϕα(A(3),α), is false since {ξ | ξ < α}(2) ∈ A(3),α is unbounded.
This counter-example and related counter-examples force one to forgo negative statements of the form X (m) 6∈ Y (m+1)
and X (m) 6= Y (m) whenm ≥ 2. This leads to the following notions, due to Tait.
Definition 1. A formula in the language of finite orders is positive iff it is build up by means of the operations ∨, ∧, ∀ and ∃
from atoms of the form x = y, x 6= y, x ∈ y, x 6∈ y, x ∈ Y (2), x 6∈ Y (2) and X (m) = X ′(m) and X (m) ∈ Y (m+1), wherem ≥ 2.
Surprisingly, even when one restricts the language in this way, there are reflection principles which have significant
strength.
Definition 2. For 0 < n < ω, Γ (2)n is the class of formulas of the form
∀X (2)1 ∃Y (k1)1 · · · ∀X (2)n ∃Y (kn)n ϕ(X (2)1 , Y (k1)1 , . . . , X (2)n , Y (kn)n , A(l1), . . . , A(ln′ ))
where ϕ does not have quantifiers of second- or higher-order and k1, . . . , kn, l1, . . . , ln′ are natural numbers.
Definition 3. For 0 < n < ω, Γ (2)n -reflection is the schema asserting that for each sentence ϕ ∈ Γ (2)n , if V |= ϕ then there is
a δ ∈ Ω such that Vδ |= ϕδ .
Definition 4 (Baumgartner). For 0 < n < ω, κ is n-ineffable iff for any 〈Kα1,...,αn | α1 < · · · < αn < κ〉 with Kα1,...,αn ⊆ α1
for α1 < · · · < αn < κ , there is an X ⊆ κ and an S stationary in κ such that for β1 < · · · < βn, all in S, X ∩ β1 = Kβ1,...,βn .
Theorem 5 (Tait). Suppose n < ω and Vκ |= Γ (2)n -reflection. Then κ is n-ineffable.
Theorem 6 (Tait). Suppose κ is a measurable cardinal. Then, for each n < ω, Vκ |= Γ (2)n -reflection.
Two questions remain: (1) How strong is Γ (2)n -reflection? (2) Can one allow universal quantifiers of order greater than
2?
4. Consistency
Definition 7. For α ≥ ω the Erdös cardinal κ(α) is the least κ such that κ → (α)<ω2 , that is, such that for each partition
P : [κ]<ω → 2 there is an X ∈ [κ]α such that Card(P ‘‘[X]n) = 1 for all n < ω, where P ‘‘Y = {P(a) | a ∈ Y }.
Lemma 8 (Silver). Assume α ≥ ω is a limit ordinal. Then the following are equivalent :
(1) κ → (α)<ω2 .
(2) For all structures M such that
(a) Card(L (M)) = ω and
(b) κ ⊆ |M|
there is an X ∈ [κ]α which is a set of indiscernibles for M.
Theorem 9. Assume κ = κ(ω) exists. Then there is a δ < κ such that Vδ satisfies Γ (2)n -reflection for all n < ω.
Proof. Our strategy is to use the Erdös cardinal to obtain a countable structureM and a non-trivial elementary embedding
j : M → M . We will then examine the critical point and show that it has the necessary reflection properties.
Step 1: Consider the structure N = 〈Vκ ,∈, <〉 where < is a well-ordering of Vκ . Let I ′ = {ι′k} be the indiscernibles of N
given by Silver’s lemma. Let HullN(I ′) be the Skolem hull of these indiscernibles and let
pi : M → HullN(I ′) ⊆ Vk
be the inverse of the transitive collapse map. Let I be the image of I ′ under the transitive collapse. Notice that I is a set of
indiscernibles for M and that by including the well-ordering< in the structure we have ensured that these indiscernibles,
which we will enumerate as {ιk}, obey the key properties (with respect to M) obeyed by the Silver indiscernibles (with
respect to L).
Now let ρ : I → I be an order preserving map which moves the first indiscernible ι0. This map uniquely extends to an
elementary embedding j : M → M with crit(j) = ι0. We aim to show that VMι0 satisfies Γ (2)n -reflection for all n.
As motivation consider a formula ϕ(A1, . . . , Am) ∈ Γn and assume
VMι0 |= ϕ(A1, . . . , Am).
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This is (equivalent to) a first-order statement in M about the parameters ι0, A1, . . . , Am. In what follows we will implicitly
appeal to such equivalences in arguments using the elementarity of j to ‘‘shift’’ various facts. We would like to show that
VMj(ι0) |= ∃α < j(ι0)
(
ϕα(j(A1)α, . . . , j(Am)α)
)
since, by the elementarity of j (applied to the corresponding first-order statement), this would imply
VMι0 |= ∃α < ι0
(
ϕα(Aα1 , . . . , A
α
m)
)
and we would be done. Now we have that
VMj(ι0) |= ϕι0(A1, . . . , Am).
So we would be done if j(A)ι0 = A. Unfortunately, this is not always true. For example, consider
A(3) = {{ξ | ξ < α}(2) | α < ι0}(3)
and notice that j(A(3))ι0 6= A(3) since the former picks up {ξ | ξ < ι0}(2).
Step 2: Fortunately, the following suffices:
Lemma 10. Suppose ϕ(A1, . . . , Am) ∈ Γ (2)n . If VMι0 |= ϕ(A1, . . . , Am) then VMι0 |= ϕ(j(A1)ι0 , . . . , j(Am)ι0).
Proof. Base Case: It will be convenient to separate the second-order variables from the higher order variables, so let us
write ϕ(A1, . . . , Am) as
ϕ
(
A(2)1 , . . . , A
(2)
j , B
(nj+1)
j+1 , . . . , B
(nm)
m
)
.
Suppose that VMι0 |= ϕ
(
A(2)1 , . . . , A
(2)
j , B
(nj+1)
j+1 , . . . , B
(nm)
m
)
. Since ι0 is inaccessible inM ,
C = {α < ι0 ∣∣ 〈VMα ,∈, A(2),α1 , . . . , A(2),αj 〉 ≺ 〈VMι0 ,∈, A(2)1 , . . . , A(2)j 〉}
is club in ι0. We claim that for α ∈ C ,
VMα |= ϕ
(
A(2)1 , . . . , A
(2)
j , B
(nj+1)
j+1 , . . . , B
(nm)
m
)
.
The key point is this: Suppose that A(2) ∈ B(3) or B(k) ∈ B(k+1) are constituents of ϕ. If such a constituent is false (evaluated
at VMι0 ) then, since it occurs positively in ϕ, it does not contribute to the truth of ϕ (evaluated at V
M
ι0
). If such a constituent is
true (evaluated at VMι0 ) then its reflected version to the α
th-level will be true (evaluated at Vα) for every α < ι0.
Now the statement that ϕ reflects to each α in C is a first-order statement of M about the parameters
ι0, C, A1, . . . , Aj, Bj+1, . . . , Bm. Thus, by the elementarity of j, the corresponding statement holds with respect to the image
of these parameters, that is, the statement
ϕ(j(A1), . . . , j(Aj), j(Bj+1), . . . , j(Bm))
reflects to the club of points j(C) below j(ι0). Since j(C) ∩ C = C and since C is unbounded in ι0 and j(C) is club, it follows
that ι0 ∈ j(C), that is, the statement ϕ(j(A1), . . . , j(Aj), . . . , j(Bj+1), . . . , j(Bm)) reflects to ι0.
Induction Step: Assume the lemma is true forψ ∈ Γ (2)n . Our aim is to show that it is true for ∀X (2)∃Y (k)ψ(X (2), Y (k), EA):
VMι0 |= ∀X (2)∃Y (k) ψ(X (2), Y (k), EA)
↔∀B ⊆ VMι0
[
VMι0 |= ψ(B(2), f (B)(k), EA)
]
→∀B ⊆ VMι0
[
VMι0 |= ψ(j(B)(2),ι0 , j(f (B))(k),ι0 , j(EA)ι0)
]
→∀B ⊆ VMι0
[
VMι0 |= ψ(B(2), f ′(B)(k), j(EA)ι0)
]
↔ VMι0 |= ∀X (2)∃Y (k) ψ(X (2), Y (k), j(EA)ι0).
In the first equivalence f : P(VMι0 ) → Pk(VMι0 ) is a Skolem function. The second implication holds by the induction
hypothesis. The final equivalence is immediate. The third implication requires further comment: The first line of the
implication provides us with a map
j(B)(2),ι0 7→ j(f (B))(k),ι0
that is defined for each B ⊆ VMι0 . We would like to extract from this map a Skolem function for the quantifier alternation
∀X (2)∃Y (k). Fortunately, (and this is the key point), for each B ⊆ VMι0 , j(B)(2),ι0 = B. Thus,
f ′ : P(VMι0 )→ Pk(VMι0 )
B 7→ j(f (B))(k),ι0
is the desired Skolem function. 
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Step 3:We can now show that VMι0 |= Γ (2)n -reflection, for all n < ω. Assume VMι0 |= ϕ(A1, . . . , An). Then
VMι0 |= ϕ(j(A1)ι0 , . . . , j(An)ι0)
by the lemma. So
VMj(ι0) |= ∃α < j(ι0)
(
ϕα(j(A1)α, . . . , j(An)α)
)
as witnessed by α = ι0. Finally, VMι0 |= ∃α < ι0
(
ϕα(Aα1 , . . . , A
α
n )
)
, by the elementarity of j.
Finally, let δ = pi(ι0). Applying pi we have that Vδ |= Γ (2)n -reflection for all n < ω, which completes the proof. 
It is important to note that in the above proof we make key use of the fact that the higher-order universal quantifiers in
a Γ (2)n -formula are second-order. The proof does not generalize to establish the consistency of Γ
(m)
n -reflection for m > 2
(contrary to what is suggested at the end of [18]). The key step in which m = 2 is used is the step where we derive the
choice function f ′ from f using j. Here it is crucial that the domain of the choice function be second-order since it is only for
second-order parameters B that we can be guaranteed that j(B)ι0 = B and hence that the derived choice function is total. To
be more specific, the third implication in the induction step of the key lemma fails for m = 3 since in this case the domain
of the derived choice function is { j(B)(3),ι0 | B ⊆ P(VMι0 )}which is a proper subset ofP2(VMι0 ).
The question remains whether Γ (m)n -reflection form > 2 is consistent relative to large cardinal axioms. There is a high-
level reason for thinking that any reflection principle which is consistent relative to large cardinals is consistent relative
to κ(ω). To see this recall that a canonical class of large cardinal axioms assert the existence of a nontrivial elementary
embedding j : V → M , whereM is a transitive proper class and that as one increases the agreement betweenM and V the
reflection properties of the critical point increase. The limiting case in which M = V was shown to be inconsistent (with
AC) by Kunen. If one drops AC and takes the embedding j : V → V one is in a situation that closely resembles our situation
with j : M → M . The difference, of course, is that we are dealing with a countable model M and not the entire universe.
However, from the point of view of a consistency proof it would appear that whatever reflection is provable from j : V → V
should also be provable from j : M → M . Since reflection would appear to be an entirely internal matter, this is a reason for
thinking that any conceivable reflection principle must have consistency strength below that of κ(ω).
5. Inconsistency
It turns out that the above consistency proof is optimal in that Γ (3)1 -reflection is inconsistent (using a fourth-order
parameter). The counterexample is best thought of in terms of a combinatorial consequence of Γ (3)1 -reflection.
Definition 11. Suppose that κ is an uncountable regular cardinal. Letm ≥ 2. A 1-sequence(m) is a function K : κ → Vκ such
that for all α < κ , K(α) ⊆ Vα+(m−2).
Definition 12. Suppose that κ is an uncountable regular cardinal, K is a 1-sequence(m), and X (m) is an mth order class over
Vκ . Then
[K , X] = {α < κ | K(α) = Xα}.
This is the set of points at which X ‘‘correctly guesses’’ K .
Definition 13. Suppose κ is an uncountable regular cardinal andm ≥ 2. Let D ⊆ κ .
(1) D is 0-stationary(m) iff D is stationary.
(2) D is (n+ 1)-stationary(m) iff for all 1-sequences(m) K there exists X (m) such that [K , X] ∩ D is n-stationary(m).
We verify that (the relevant case of) one of Tait’s results generalizes from the second-order to the third-order context.
Theorem 14 (Tait). Suppose that Vκ satisfies Γ
(3)
1 -reflection. Then κ is 1-stationary
(3).
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that κ is not 1-stationary(3). We claim that there exists ϕ ∈ Γ (3)1 and a fourth-order
parameter T (4) such that ϕ(T (4)) does not reflect, that is,
(1) Vκ |= ϕ(T (4)) and
(2) for all β < κ , Vβ 6|= ϕ(T (4),β).
Let K : κ → Vκ be a 1-sequence(3) which is a counterexample to the 1-stationarity(3) of κ . For each X (3) ⊆ Vκ+1 let CX be a
club such that
[K , X] ∩ CX = ∅.
Let
T (4) = {(K (2), X (3), C (2)X ) | X (3) ⊆ Vκ+1}.
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Let
ϕ(T (4)) = ∀X (3)∃K (2)∃C (2)((K , X, C) ∈ T (4) ∧ C is unbounded).
Notice that this is a Γ (3)1 -statement about a fourth-order parameter. (We are implicitly using coding devices to collapse
the existential quantifiers and code the heterogeneous relation T (4) as a fourth-order class T ∗,(4) in such a way that for all
α ∈ Lim, T (4),α is coded (in the same way) by T ∗,(4),α . See [18] for details.)
Claim 15. For each X (3) ⊆ Vκ+1,
(i) Vκ |= ‘‘CX is unbounded’’ and
(ii) for all β ∈ [K , X], Vβ 6|= ‘‘CβX is unbounded’’.
Proof. (i) This is immediate since CX is club in κ . (ii) Suppose, for contradiction, that β ∈ [K , X] is such that Vβ |=
‘‘CβX is unbounded’’. Since CX is club in κ this implies β ∈ CX ∩ [K , X], which contradicts the fact that CX was chosen to
be such that CX ∩ [K , X] = ∅. 
It follows that Vκ |= ϕ(T (4)), since for each X (3) ⊆ Vκ+1 our fixed K and chosen CX are witnesses. So we have proved (1).
It remains to prove (2), namely, Vβ 6|= ϕβ(T (4),β), for all β < κ . Suppose, for contradiction, that β < κ is such that
Vβ |= ϕβ(T (4),β), that is,
Vβ |= ∀X (3)∃K (2)∃C (2)
(
(K , X, C) ∈ T (4),β ∧ C is unbounded).
For the particular choice X = K(β), let K (2)0 and C (2)0 be such that
(*) Vβ |= (K (2)0 , X, C (2)0 ) ∈ T (4),β ∧ C (2)0 is unbounded.
Since (K0, K(β), C0) ∈ T (4),β we have
(a) K0 = Kβ ,
(b) K(β) = X ′β for some X ′ ⊆ Vκ+1, and
(c) C0 = CβX ′ (where this is our canonical choice for X ′),
where (K , X ′, CX ′) ∈ T (4).
Now, in defining T (4) we chose CX to be such that when (K , X, CX ) ∈ T (4) we have
[K , X] ∩ CX = ∅.
Thus, in particular, [K , X ′] ∩ CX ′ = ∅, that is, for all α ∈ CX ′ , K(α) 6= X ′α. Now, by the Claim,
(d) Vκ |= ‘‘CX ′ is unbounded’’ and
(e) ∀β ∈ [K , X ′] Vβ 6|= ‘‘CβX ′ is unbounded’’.
However, by (b), β ∈ [K , X ′] and so, by (e),
Vβ 6|= ‘‘CβX ′ is unbounded’’.
But by (c), C0 = CβX ′ , so
Vβ 6|= ‘‘C0 is unbounded’’,
which contradicts (*). 
Theorem 16. Γ (3)1 -reflection is inconsistent.
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that Vκ satisfies Γ
(3)
1 -reflection. Then, by the above theorem, κ is 1-stationary
(3). We
arrive at a counterexample by constructing a 1-sequence(3) which cannot be stationarily guessed. For α ∈ Lim, let
Aα =
{{ξ | ξ < γ } | γ < α}.
Let KA : κ → Vκ be such that K(α) = Aα if α ∈ Lim and K(α) = ∅ otherwise. We claim that for each X (3) ⊆ Vκ+1,
[KA, X] ∩ Lim contains at most one point. Suppose Xα = KA(α), where α ∈ Lim. If α′ ∈ Lim is such that α′ > α and
Xα
′ = KA(α′) then there exists Y (2) ∈ X such that Y (2),α′ = {ξ | ξ < α}, in which case Y (2),α = {ξ | ξ < α} ∈ KA(α), which
is a contradiction. Similarly, since Xα = KA(α), for each α¯ ∈ Lim ∩ α there exists Y (2) ∈ X such that Y (2),a = {ξ | ξ < α¯}, in
which case Y (2),α¯ = {ξ | ξ < α¯} ∈ KA(α¯) and hence X α¯ 6= KA(α¯). Hence [KA, X] ∩ Lim contains at most one point.
It follows that X (3) cannot stationarily guess KA since if [KA, X] is stationary then [K , X]∩Lim is stationary, which is clearly
impossible since it contains at most one point. 
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6. Dichotomy
The results of the previous two sections show that the reflection principles we have considered can be divided into two
classes:
(1) Weak: Γ (2)n -reflection, for n < ω.
(2) Inconsistent: Γ (m)n -reflection, form > 2 and n ≥ 1.
Since Γ (3)1 comes directly after
⋃
n<ω Γ
(2)
n , this classification is exhaustive and we have a dichotomy theorem: Reflection
principles are either weak or inconsistent.
One response to this is that although we have a dichotomy with respect to our coarse classification there is still the
possibility that a finer classification leads to reflection principles which are strong (and so fall outside the scope of our
consistency theorem) andmanage to skirt inconsistency. Indeed a finer classification can be readily obtained by looking not
at full universal third- and higher-order quantification but various restricted forms of these. Setting aside the problem of
motivating such a restriction in a principled way, in this section we prove a much sharper dichotomy theorem.
To isolate the necessary restriction on the domain of third-order universal quantification we begin by looking at a series
of counter-examples and responses.
First Modification. Notice that although KA (from the proof of the inconsistency theorem (Theorem 16)) cannot be
stationarily guessed by any X (3) ⊆ Vκ+1 it can be stationarily guessed by some X (2) ⊆ Vκ ; in fact, it is guessed everywhere
by κ (2). This suggests modifying the notion of 1-stationarity(3) to allow guesses of either the form X (2) ⊆ Vκ or X (3) ⊆ Vκ+1.
However, there is a counterexample to this as well. For α ∈ Lim, let
Bα =
{{ξ | γ > ξ ≤ α} | γ < α}.
Let KB : κ → Vκ be such that K(α) = Bα if α ∈ Lim and K(α) = ∅ otherwise. For X (2) ⊆ Vκ , [KB, X] ∩ Lim = ∅. For
X (3) ⊆ Vκ+1, [KB, X] ∩ Lim can contain at most one point.
Second Modification. One response to the counterexample KB is to restrict our attention to ‘‘full’’ 1-sequences(3), that
is, 1-sequences(3) such that for each α ∈ Lim, min{rank(Y ) | Y ∈ K(α)} < α. However, this also has a counterexample. For
α ∈ Lim, let
Cα =
{
α − {ξ} | ξ < α}.
Let KB : κ → Vκ be such that K(α) = Cα if α ∈ Lim and K(α) = ∅ otherwise. This is a full 1-sequence(3) such that for each
X (2) ⊆ Vκ , [KC , X] ∩ Lim = ∅ and for each X (3) ⊆ Vκ+1, [KC , X] ∩ Lim contains at most one point.
ThirdModification.One response to the counterexample KC is that although it is full and cannot be stationarily guessed
by any X (2) ⊆ Vκ or any X (3) ⊆ Vκ , it can be recast as a 1-sequence(2) which can be guessed by some X (2) ⊆ Vκ . More
generally, suppose K : κ → Vκ is a full 1-sequence(3) which is ‘‘narrow’’ in the sense that for each α ∈ Lim, |K(α)| ≤ |α|.
Relative to a fixed well-ordering let 〈K(α)ξ | ξ < α〉 enumerate K(α). Now define the derived sequence K ′ : κ → Vκ to be
such that K ′(α) = {〈ξ, x〉 | ξ < α ∧ x ∈ K(α)ξ } if α ∈ Lim and K ′(α) = ∅ otherwise. The sequence K ′ codes K and can
be stationarily guessed by some X (2) ⊆ Vκ . So, to obtain strength, the above counter-examples suggest restricting attention
to 1-sequences K which are ‘‘full’’ and ‘‘wide’’, that is, such that (1) for all Y ∈ K(α), Y ⊆ α × Vα and dom(Y ) = α and (2)
|K(α)| > |α|. However, although the restriction to full and wide 1-sequences(3) rules out counterexamples like KA, KB, and
KC it does not rule out a simple ‘‘wide’’ version of KC : For α ∈ Lim, ξ < α, and Y ⊆ α, let
Yξ =
{〈γ , i, j〉 | (γ < α) ∧ (i = 0↔ γ 6= ξ) ∧ (j = 0↔ γ ∈ Y )},
where i and j range over {0, 1}. (The role of the second coordinate is to code α − {ξ} and the role of the third coordinate is
to code Y . Thus we are ‘‘tagging’’ α − {ξ}with Y .) For α ∈ Lim, let
C∗α = {Yξ | ξ < α ∧ Y ⊆ α}.
Finally, let KC∗ : κ → Vκ be such that KC∗ = C∗α if α ∈ Lim and KC∗ = ∅ otherwise. The idea is that KC∗(α) has 2α-
many subcollections, each corresponding to a given Y ⊆ α, each of size |α|, and each such that something specific happens
unboundedly often. This is a 1-full-wide sequence which cannot be stationarily guessed.
What all of the above counter-examples have in common is that they involve collections which lack a certain ‘‘closure’’.
To make this precise we concentrate on third-order classes consisting of second-order class of ordinals. Over Vα such a class
B is canonically coded by a collection of branches through 2α , each branch being the characteristic function of a second-order
class of ordinals. To say that a third-order class of second-order classes of ordinals is closed is simply to say that the associated
collection of branches is closed in the standard topology (where basic open intervals have the form Os = {t ∈ 2α | s ⊆ t},
where s ∈ 2<α .)
The above counter-examples all involve K(α) (for α ∈ Lim) which are not closed. In each case K(α) is uniformly defined
for α ∈ Lim. Moreover, for each α ∈ Lim, K(α) is missing a continuity point that is inevitably added by the relativization of
any X (3) which correctly guesses K(α′) for some α′ ∈ Lim such that α′ > α.
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The above counter-examples all involve restrictions of the combinatorial notion of 1-stationarity(3) but ourmain interest
is in restrictions of the notion of Γ (3)1 -reflection. It will therefore be of importance to investigate the connection between
the two.
Since we are interested in reflection principles extending second-order reflection principles we may assume that the
height of the universe Vκ is Mahlo (or more) and that in any reflection argument we reflect to a level Vα where α is also
Mahlo (or more). Since in this case |Vα| = |α|, we may, without loss of generality, concentrate on third-order quantifiers
which range overP(P(α)).
Let X c(3) range over the closed third-order classes of second-order classes of ordinals. This range of quantification is
uniformly defined with respect to Vα for each α ∈ Lim. More generally, let XΓ (3) range over the Γ (3)-third-order classes of
second-order classes of ordinals, where Γ (3) is a pointclass which is uniformly defined with respect to Vα for each α ∈ Lim.
The pointclasses Γ (3) that will be of particular importance for us are those in the generalized Borel hierarchy which starts
with the closed third-order classes over 2α and proceeds by iterating the operations of α-union and complementation.
Definition 17. Suppose κ is regular and uncountable. Suppose Γ (3) is a third-order pointclass as above. A 1-sequenceΓ (3)
is a function K : κ → Vκ such that there is a club CK in κ such that for all α ∈ CK , K(α) ⊆ 2α is in Γ (3). A cardinal κ is
1-stationaryΓ (3) iff for all 1-sequencesΓ (3) K there exists X (3) such that [K , X] is stationary.
Definition 18. Suppose Γ (3) is a third-order pointclass as above. The collection of Γ Γ (3)n -formulas is defined exactly as
before except that now all third-order universal quantifiers are replaced with ∀XΓ (3) and interpreted to range over the
pointclass Γ (3).
Theorem 19. Suppose Vκ satisfies Γ
Γ (3)
1 -reflection. Then κ is 1-stationary
Γ (3).
Proof. The proof is a modification of the proof of Theorem 14. Suppose, for contradiction, that κ is not 1-stationaryΓ (3). Let
K : κ → Vκ be a 1-sequenceΓ (3) which is a counter-example to the 1-stationarityΓ (3) of κ . For each XΓ (3) ∈ P(P(κ)) let
CX be a club such that [K , X] ∩ CX = ∅. Let CK be the club from the definition of a 1-sequenceΓ (3). Let
T (4) = {(K (2), XΓ (3), C (2)X , C (2)K ) | XΓ (3) ∈ P(P(κ))}.
Let
ϕ(T (4)) = ∀XΓ (3)∃K (2)∃C (2)∃C ′(2) ((K , X, C, C ′) ∈ T (4) ∧ C1 and C2 are unbounded).
This is a Γ Γ (3)1 -formula. As before, for each X
Γ (3) ∈ P(P(κ)),
(1) Vκ |= ‘‘CX is unbounded’’ and
(2) for all β ∈ [K , X], Vβ 6|= ‘‘CβX is unbounded’’.
It follows that
Vκ |= ϕ(T (4)),
since for each XΓ (3) ∈ P(P(κ)) our fixed K , CK and chosen CX are witnesses. It remains to prove that
Vβ 6|= ϕβ(T (4),β),
for all β < κ . Suppose, for contradiction, that β < κ is such that
Vβ |= ϕβ(T (4),β),
that is,
Vβ |= ∀XΓ (3)∃K (2)∃C (2)∃C ′(2)
(
(K , X, C, C ′) ∈ T (4),β ∧ C and C ′ are unbounded).
Notice that C1 = CβK . Moreover, since CβK is unbounded in β and since CK is club, it follows that β ∈ CK . Thus, X = K(β) is
in Γ (3) and hence is a legitimate substituent for the universal quantifier ∀XΓ (3) in the formula displayed above. The rest of
the proof is as before. 
Theorem 20. SupposeΓ (3) is a pointclass in the generalized Borel hierarchy that properly extends the closed classes. ThenΓ Γ (3)1 -
reflection is inconsistent.
Proof. This follows from the previous theorem in conjunction with the earlier counter-examples. 
Because of this one is essentially forced to pare the third-order quantifiers down to the closed sets. The question remains
whether doing so leads to consistent reflection principles.
Theorem 21. Assume κ = κ(ω) exists. Then there is a δ < κ such that Vδ satisfies Γ c(3)n -reflection for all n < ω.
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Proof. The proof is as before. The key point is that for Bc(3),
j(B)c(3),ι0 = Bc(3).
Thus, we can extract the derived Skolem function in the third implication of the induction step as before. 
It remains to consider quantifiers of order beyond third-order. For the reasons noted earlier we may, without loss of
generality, concentrate on nth-order quantifiers which range overPn−1(α)when interpreted over Vα .
The earlier counter-examples easily generalize to higher-orders and enable us to isolate the appropriate notion of closure
needed to avoid them. For illustrative purposes we concentrate on the fourth-order.
For α ∈ Lim and for γ < α let Tαγ be the tree consisting of the single branch b ∈ 2α such that for all ξ < γ + 1, b(ξ) = 1
and for all ξ ≥ γ + 1, b(ξ) = 0. For α ∈ Lim, let
Dα = {Tαγ | γ < α}.
Let KD : κ → Vκ be such that K(α) = Dα if α ∈ Lim and KD(α) = ∅ otherwise. This is a 1-sequence(4) such that for each
X (4) ⊆ Vκ+2, [KD, X] ∩ Lim contains at most one point.
To rule out such counter-examples we must restrict to fourth-order classes that are ‘‘closed’’ in the following sense:
Suppose 〈Tγ | γ < α〉 is a sequence of trees such that each Tγ ⊆ 2<α . We say that the sequence is increasing if for each
ξ < α there is an ordinal f (ξ) < α such that for all γ1, γ2 ≥ η, we have Tγ1 ξ = Tγ2 ξ . In such a situation we say that the
sequence converges to the limit tree T =⋃ξ<α Tf (ξ). A fourth-order classX (4) overVα is said to be closed iff it consists of closed
third-order classes and is such that it contains the limit trees of every convergent subsequence of length α. Let X c(4) range
over the closed fourth-order classes. This is exactly the notion of closure which is needed to rule out the counter-examples.
Moreover, the counter-example easily generalizes to higher-orders. We let X c(m) range over the closed sets ofmth-order. As
before there is a corresponding generalized Borel hierarchy at each level and the proof of Theorem 19 generalizes to show
that for any level Γ (m) of this hierarchy beyond c(m), Γ Γ (m)1 -reflection is inconsistent for allm > 2.
It remains to see that for m > 2 and n < ω, Γ c(m)n -reflection is weak. Work over Vκ . The key point is that we can code
trees T ⊆ 2<κ with b(T ) ∈ 2k in such a way that
〈 Tα | α < κ 〉 converges to T iff 〈 b(Tα) | α < κ 〉 converges to b(T ).
It follows that each closed fourth-order class can be coded by a tree T ⊆ 2<κ . This, of course, generalized to higher-orders.
Theorem 22. Assume κ = κ(ω) exists. Then there is a δ < κ such that Vδ satisfies Γ c(m)n -reflection for all m, n < ω.
Proof. The proof is a modification of that of Theorem 9. The key change is in the inductive step.
Suppose Bc(m) is a closed mth-order class over VMι0 where m > 2. Let TB ⊆ 2ι0 be a closed tree coding Bc(m). Let C be the
closure of
{α < ι0 | M |= ‘‘α is strongly inaccessible’’}.
Wemay assume that the coding has been done in such a way that for all α ∈ C , TαB codes Bα . Since TB is closed,
j(TB)ι0 = TB.
By elementarity, for each α ∈ j(C),
j(TB)α codes j(B)α.
However, since j(C) is club and since j(C) ∩ ι0 = C is unbounded in ι0, ι0 ∈ j(C). Thus,
j(TB)ι0 = TB codes j(B)ι0 ,
which means that
j(B)ι0 = B.
This ensures that we can extract the derived choice function as before. 
Thus we have the following sharper dichotomy:
(1) Weak: Γ c(m)n -reflection, for allm > 2 and n < ω.
(2) Inconsistent: Γ Γ (m)n -reflection, for all m > 2 and n ≥ 1 and any pointclass Γ (m) containing the first level of the
generalized Borel hierarchy beyond the closed sets.
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7. Discussion
In the above results we have concentrated on quantifiers and parameters of finite order. However, one can make sense
of quantifiers and parameters of transfinite orders and, for each ordinal α, one can define the notion of Γ (α)n -reflection in
the natural way. The results generalize to show (i) that to avoid inconsistency one must impose a closure constraint on the
universal quantifiers of third- and higher-order and (ii) that resulting reflection principles are bounded below κ(ω).
Onewould like to conclude from this that ‘‘reflection principles’’ in general areweak. But absent a precise characterization
of the notion of a reflection principle one cannot state, let alone prove, a limitative result to this effect. Moreover, it is hard
to see how one could give an adequate precise characterization of the informal notion of a reflection principle since the
notion appears to be inherently schematic and ‘‘indefinitely extendible’’ in the sense that any attempted precisification can
be transcended by reflecting on reflection. However, ourmain limitative result is also schematic and the proof would appear
to be able to track any degree of reflecting on reflection—the Erdös cardinal κ(ω) appears to be an impassable barrier as far as
reflection is concerned. This is not a precise statement. But it leads to the following challenge: Formulate a strong reflection
principle which is intrinsically justified on the iterative conception of set and which breaks the κ(ω) barrier.
It is natural at this point to think of the classic discussion of the justification of new axioms in [13]. It is important to note,
however, that this discussion involves a very difference conception of set which has its roots in Reinhardt’s dissertation [12].
This conception involves supplementing the iterative conceptionwithwhat onemight call the theory of legitimate candidates.
On this view there are a number of ‘‘possible alternative interpretations of V ’’, each of which has the form Vα . Let Vα0 , Vα1
be a pair of such candidates, where Vα0 ( Vα1 . Reinhardt’s basic method for obtaining strong principles is ‘‘to exploit the
principle which says that mathematical truths should be necessary truths’’ and ‘‘[a]ccording to this principle, if the notion
of possibility we have introduced is a good one, something true in one interpretation of V should be necessarily true, that
is, true in all possible alternative interpretations of V ’’ ([12], p. 76). In particular, taking the language to be first-order with
parameters from Vα0 one should have that for each ϕ and for each parameter a ∈ Vα0 , Vα0 |= ϕ[a] iff Vα1 |= ϕ[a], that is,
Vα0 ≺ Vα1 . The next step is to enrich the language to second-order and allow second-order parameters. Reinhardt assumes
that for each class X ⊂ Vα0 one can ‘‘reinterpret’’ the class over Vα1 as j(X) ⊂ Vα1 in such a way that (Vα0 , X) ≺ (Vα1 , j(X)).
Letting the interpretation function j be constant on elements of Vα1 this is equivalent to asserting that there is an elementary
embedding j : Vα0+1 → Vα1+1,with critical point α0, that is, it is equivalent to asserting that α0 is a 1-extendible.
There are a number of difficulties with this approach—there are problems with the underlying conception and problems
with the derivation of strong principles. One problem with the underlying conception is that the theory of potential
candidates is difficult to defend. For example, since candidates which come later in the sequence will have greater
closure properties than candidates which come earlier it is hard to defend the idea that they are both equally legitimate
interpretations of V . Another difficulty is that underlying notion of mathematical modality would require considerable
clarification and defense (especially in light of the fact that mathematics is traditionally thought to concern objects that
necessarily exist).
But even if the underlying conception can be clarified in a satisfactory way, there are two problems with the derivation
of strong principles. The first problem is what one might call the problem of tracking: In reinterpreting the class X ⊂ Vα0 as
j(X) ⊂ Vα1 there must be some intensional notion at play. Now, one can certainly track definable classes by using their
definitions. But Reinhardt wishes to shift every subset of Vα0 and for this he requires an exceedingly rich collection of
intensional notions. Moreover, these intensional notions must be of a very special sort. For example, it would not do to
associate to each set the concept of being that set since Reinhardt needs to ‘‘stretch’’ the classes. It is unclear that such a
collection of concepts exists. Moreover, even if it did it would be a further step to assume that it gave rise to an elementary
embedding of the required sort.
The second problem is what one might call the problem of extendibility to inconsistency: Even if one could provide
and defend a theory of the required intensional objects it would appear that the theory would generalize and lead to
inconsistency. In his dissertation Reinhardt did indeed think that the theory generalized: ‘‘[I]n order to extend [the above
schema] to allow parameters of arbitrary (in the sense of V2) order over V0 we simply remove the restriction X ⊆ V0’’
([12], p. 79). Here V0 is our Vα1 and V2 is some legitimate candidate Vα2 beyond Vα0 and Vα1 . The trouble is that when one
generalizes in this way the result is a non-trivial elementary embedding j : V → V which Kunen showed to be inconsistent
(with AC). (In fact, Kunen showed that even the existence of a non-trivial embedding j : Vλ+2 → Vλ+2 is inconsistent.)
By the time he wrote his 1974 paper Reinhardt knew of this result. The point, however, is that the case Reinhardt makes
for 1-extendibles appears to extend to a case for the inconsistent axiom. Hence, unless one can give principled reasons for
blocking the extension, the case falters.
One can overcome both the problem of tracking and the problem of extendibility to consistency by restricting to classes
which are definablewith parameters. Iterating this through the constructible universe built over a given legitimate candidate
Vα0 one can make a case for the following axiom, which is more appropriately called an extension principle: For all γ there
exist α0 and α1 and an elementary embedding j : L(Vα0)→ L(Vα1) where γ < α0 < α1. This axiom is consistent (relative
to mild large cardinal assumptions). So by overcoming the problem of tracking in this way one also overcomes the problem
of extendibility to inconsistency. Furthermore, the resulting axiom implies that X# exists for all X and so freezes Σ∼
1
3. This
still leaves us with the problem of defending the underlying conception. In [5] I examined this conception and concluded
on a skeptical note. In any case, although such an axiom might be intrinsically plausible on such an alternative conception,
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it is hard to see how it could be intrinsically justified solely on the basis of the iterative conception of set that we have been
discussing.
There is anotherway inwhich onemight try to justify strong principles resembling reflection principles. Up until nowwe
have concentrated on principles which say that the height of the universe cannot be approximated from below. One might
consider related principles which articulate the idea that thewidth of the universe cannot be approximated fromwithin. On
this approach to say that the universe cannot be approximated from within is to say that there is no ‘‘L-like model’’ which
‘‘approximates’’ or ‘‘covers’’ the universe. This general principle – the principle of width reflection – would then be rendered
precise in terms of the various models occurring in inner model theory and their corresponding covering properties. For
example, at the first stage one would simply take Gödel’s constructible universe L as the approximating universe and as the
notion of approximation onewould take the notion involved in Jensen’s original covering lemma, that is, to say that L covers
V is to say that for every uncountable set of ordinals X there is an Y ∈ L such that |Y | = |X | and X ⊆ Y . The statement
that L does not cover V implies, by the covering lemma, that 0# exists. A second application of width reflection would then
lead to the existence of 0##. In this way we proceed through the ‘‘sharp hierarchy’’ (using the same covering property in
each application of with reflection) until we reach the Dodd–Jensen core model K . One more application of width reflection
yields an inner model with a measurable cardinal. From this stage onward the covering property used in the applications of
width reflection is necessarily weaker, by a result of Prikry. A basic consequence of current innermodel theory (in particular,
the core model induction) is that successive applications ofwidth reflection ultimately imply PD and ADL(R) and so definitely
lead to a significant reduction in incompleteness. However, although the principle of width reflection may be intrinsically
plausible it is hard to defend the idea that it is intrinsically justified on the basis of the iterative conception of set.
There may be other ways of intrinsically justifying principles which lead to a significant reduction in incompleteness.
Gödel certainly believed that amore profound analysis of the concept of set (following the lines of Husserl’s phenomenology)
would lead to such principles. I am not optimistic but I do not wish to make a stronger claim than that.
Let me close by discussing some applications of the above limitative results. The first concerns inner model theory. In
the approach discussed above one approximates the hypothesis that ‘‘there exists a measurable cardinal’’ from within via
width reflection. One would like to approximate 0# from below in a similar fashion and the most natural way to do this is
through height reflection. However, the results of this paper make this approach seem doubtful since κ(ω) appears to be
out of reach of reflection. The second concerns intrinsic justifications. The inconsistency result shows that serious problems
can arise even when one is embarked on the project of unfolding the content of a conception. It should give us pause in
placing too much confidence in the security of intrinsic justifications. Third, the consistency result shows that intrinsic
justifications, insofar as they are exhausted by the general reflection principles discussed above, will not take us very far.
Finally, these results can be used to provide a rational reconstruction of Gödel’s early view to the effect that V= L, PU, and CH
are ‘‘absolutely undecidable’’. The idea is that if one has a conception of set theory which admits only intrinsic justifications
and if one thinks that these are exhausted by reflection principles then the above results make a case for the claim that these
statements really are ‘‘absolutely undecidable’’.11 Fortunately, extrinsic justifications go a long way and I think that one can
make a strong extrinsic case for V 6= L and PU.12 Whether CH is ‘‘absolutely undecidable’’ is, of course, a more delicate
question.13
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